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EXPLANATION OF RECORD ON REVIEW

The following items in explaining the Record on Review
may be helpful to the Court:
1.

SUPPRESSION HEARING TRANSCRIPT -- A motion to

suppress evidence was presented to the Court before
trial.

A transcript of that proceeding was prepared,

but the original was apparently lost or misplaced.
After conference with the Court and counsel, it was
determined that a copy of that transcript would be
supplied as an original.
has been submitted.

A stipulation in that regard

To distinguish the transcript of

the suppression hearing from the trial transcript, the
designation M SHT M will be utilized for the Suppression
Hearing Transcript and the usual designation of T,TR,f
will be employed for the two volume trial transcript.
2.

EXHIBITS -- It was initially thought that all

exhibits were forwarded to the Supreme Court by the
District Court, and then transferred to this Court
with other documents comprising the record.
discovered that such was not the case.

It was

The exhibits

were then located in the District Court Clerk1s

Explanation of Record on Review
- 2-

office.

Defendant's counsel then filed a request for

the Clerk to forward those documents to this Court.
Of those, Exhibit #10 is missing.

Exhibit #10 is the

cocaine itself and remains in the custody of law
enforcement personnel.

The originals of Exhibits #12,

#13 and #14 were withdrawn by the State and copies
were supplied in their place.
exhibits will be found.

Two packages of

One package will contain the

exhibits for the trial of Villa and the other package
will contain the exhibits received in the instant
matter.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ft

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.

*

Case No. 860232-CA

*

ELIAS R. DeALO,
Defendant and
Appellant.

*
*

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT AND NATURE
OF PROCEEDINGS IN LOWER COURT
The Supreme Court acquired jurisdiction of this appeal
pursuant to Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, §5, UCA §78-2-2,
and Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Transfer to

this Court was made under Rule 4A(a), Rules of the Utah Court
of Appeals.

Jurisdiction appears from UCA §78-2a-3, and Rule

3(a), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
Defendant was tried by jury in the District Court for
the offense of Possession With Intent To Distribute For Value A
Controlled Substance in contravention of UCA §58-37-8(1)(a)(ii),
a second degree felony.

The Jury returned a verdict of guilty

and Defendant was sentenced by the Court to an indeterminate
term in the Utah State Prison of not less than one, nor more
than fifteen years, and a fine of $10,000.00.

- 2-

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
This appeal presents the following issues for
resolution on appeal:
1. Did the Court improperly hold that Defendant
lacked standing to contest the search of the
vehicle which he was driving and the seizure of
items located therein.
2. Did the Court err in charging the Jury with
an nAiding and Abetting" instruction as defined
in UCA §76-2-202.
3. Did the Court err in allowing Exhibit 11 (A
California search warrant and supporting
affidavit) in evidence.
4. Did the Court err in allowing Exhibit 14 (A
ledger of California drug transactions) in
evidence.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Applicable constitutional provisions, statutes and
rules are the following:
Constitution of the United States, Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
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Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIV, Section 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
Constitution of Utah, Article 1, §14
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
Section 58-57-8(1)(a)(ii), Utah Code Annotated (1953)
Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful
any person knowingly and intentionally to distribute
value or possess with intent to distribute for value
controlled or counterfeit substance.
Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv), Utah Code Annotated (1953)
Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful
for any person knowingly and intentionally to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute or dispense a
controlled substance for value or to negotiate or to have
a controlled substance distributed or dispensed for value
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and distribute, dispense, or negotiate the distribution or
dispensing of any other liquid, substance, or material
instead of the specific controlled substance so offered,
agreed, consented, arranged, or negotiated.
Section 76-2-202, Utah Code Annotated (1953)
Every person, acting with the mental state required
for the commission of an offense who directly commits the
offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or
intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct
which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as
a party for such conduct.
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other
crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, oppotunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence
of mistake or accident.
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Rule 803(8), Utah Rules of Evidence
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule,
even though the declarant is available as a witness:
Public records and reports. Records, reports,
statements, or data compilations, in any form, of
public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the
activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters
observed pursuant to duty to report, excluding,
however, in criminal cases matters observed by police
officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C)
in civil actions and proceedings and against the
Government in criminal cases, factual findings
resulting from an investigation made pursuant to
authority granted by law, unless the sources of
information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness.
STATEMENT OF THE CASg
This is a criminal case. Defendant (DeAlo) and
Co-defendant (Villa) were jointly charged with the second
degree felony of possession with intent to distribute for value
a controlled substance, contrary to Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii),
Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended. The case was severed
and each Defendant was tried to a jury separately. Both were
convicted as charged and sentenced to prison and fined the sum
of $10,000.00.
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The facts of the case are not complicated.

On

February 12, 1986, Officer James D. Hillin, Utah Highway Patrol,
stopped a vehicle for speeding near Salina, Utah (TR 70-71).
Defendant was the driver of the car (TR 82) and Co-defendant
Villa was a passenger.

Officer Hillin searched the car at the

scene of the stop (TR 74) claiming a written consent to do so
from DeAlo (TR 73). During an initial forty-five minute search
(TR 152), he observed a metal container in the trunk (TR 75).
He then left the scene, but returned an hour and one half later
(TR 152-3), armed with a search warrant (TR 77). During that
time the car was moved by police officers to an impound lot (TR
153).

Officers then began a dismantling of the car (TR 78)

using power tools (TR 155), which resulted in the discovery of
five wrapped packages (TR 79), shown to be cocaine after
analysis by the State Crime Lab (TR 88 $ 92). The narcotics
were found solely within the metal box inside the trunk of the
vehicle (TR 152).
Defendant testified that he was a native of Columbia
(TR 186) who moved to California in 1983 (TR 168-69) and
obtained employment with a Carlos Clibe, the husband of a
cousin (TR 169). He was formally introduced to Villa in
February, 1986 (TR 170), but had seen him at a social gathering
(TR 170) on an earlier occasion (TR 183).
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Defendant was invited by Villa to accompany him to New
York (TR 173) and he arranged a two week leave from his
employment for that purpose (TR 173). The two left Los Angeles
on February 12, 1986 (TR 174-75).

Defendant had luggage which

he placed in the trunk of the car (TR 175).j
The car was owned by Antonio Villa, a brother of
Co-defendant Villa (TR 86). It was registered in New York and
Villa had lawful possession (TR 87). A check by Officer Hillin
indicated the car was not stolen (TR 84). Defendant had a validdriver license (TR 83), as did Villa (TR 156).
The car was filled with numerous items of personal
property (SHT 16). Items such as plastic cases, tape cassettes,
blankets, pillows, and personal clothing were located in the
vehicle (SHT 16-17).

The trunk of the vehicle contained suit-

cases, spare tires, extra fuel and a tool box (SHT 17). The
vehicle was a medium sized car and both the floorboards and the
trunk were described by Officer Hillin as "quite fulln with
items of personal property (SHT 18).
Officer Hillin acknowledged having substantial
information about the car and its occupants before his search
(SHT 18). He knew the addresses of Villa and Defendant (SHT
18).

He knew the car was registered to Antonio Villa in New

York, and that Antonio Villa was the brother of Co-defendant
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Villa (SHT 19). It was Officer Hillin who was told that the
occupants were on vacation, en route from California to New
York,

The personal belongings in the car had been identified

to him as belonging to Defendant and Villa (SHT 19) and he knew
that each had personal effects in both the front and trunk of
the car (SHT 20).
Officer Hillin considered the so-called consent to
search as being limited to the front of the car, and probably
the trunk (SHT 24), but apparently did not view it as extending
to containers within the car since he interrupted his efforts
for the purpose of obtaining a search warrant.
The Court held that neither Defendant nor Villa had
standing to raise the issue of an unlawful search and seizure.
Before the presentation of evidence at the suppression hearing,
the Court observed:
But I understand it's fundamental if
they didn!t own the car, if they have
no possessory interest in it, they have
no standing period. I can start with
that basic premise. (SHT 8-9)
The ruling of the Court did not contain any factual
findings.

It merely stated that, "They have no standing under

Rakas v. Illinois" (SHT 30).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I -- Defendant had the joint use and possession
of a vehicle containing numerous items of personal belongings
while en route from California to New York.
expectation of privacy in the car.
those privacy interests.

He had a legitimate

A search of the car invaded

He had standing to attack the search.

The Court erred in holding that standing did not exist.

The

Court's error was two-fold. (1) The Court failed to find a
possessory interest in the car by Defendant, contrary to the
Court's own announced standard, and (2) the Court failed to
consider joint possession, joint use, expectation of privacy
and other factors which indicate standing.
Point II -- The Court allowed an "aiding and abetting11
instruction under UCA §76-2-202, contrary to both statutory and
case law which clearly indicate that the legislature has
mandated the employment of a jury instruction for "arranging"
pursuant to UCA § 58-37-8(1) (a) (iv) in a case of this nature.
Point III -- The Court admitted Exhibit #11, a
California search warrant and its supporting affidavit, which
was rank hearsay and not admissible under an enumerated
exception to the hearsay rule.

The exhibit also implied other

crimes or wrongdoing on the part of Defendant, contrary to Rule
404(b), URE, and which was highly prejudicial to Defendant and
therefore inadmissible under Rule 403, URE.
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Point IV -- The Court admitted Exhibit #14, an
accounting or ledger of narcotic sales, which indicated other
crimes or wrongdoing by Defendant, having no relationship to
the crime at issue, in violation of Rules 403 and 404(b), URE.

ARGUMENT
POINT I -- THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CONTEST THE SEARCH
OF THE AUTOMOBILE,
Defendant contends that the trial Court committed error
in holding that he did not have standing to contest the search
of the automobile.

He claims to have had a legitimate expecta-

tion of privacy in the area searched, a standard which the trial
Court failed to employ.
Relying on Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), the
trial Court considered only the factors of ownership and possession as supplying the requisite basis to show standing to
attack the lawfulness of a search and/or seizure.

As subse-

quent argument will show, an assessment of Rakas, supra, and
the overwhelming body of federal case law, reveals that the
trial Court's

,f

basic premise" is clearly erroneous and that to

establish standing in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, a criminal
defendant must show only a reasonable expectation of privacy in
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the area searched, not a proprietary or possessory interest in
the area searched.

But putting aside the undeniable precept

that since the trial Court employed the wrong standard against
which to test the evidence of standing, thus necessitating a
reversal because there is no lawful finding of standing to
review, let us nevertheless cut into the core of the defective
analysis.
At the outset, it is worthwhile to review the factual
content of the Rakas opinion.

After receiving a robbery report,

police stopped the suspected getaway car, which the owner was
driving and in which petitioners were passengers.

Upon search-

ing the car, the police found a box of rifle shells in the glove
compartment and a sawed-off rifle under the front passenger seat
and arrested petitioners.

Before trial, petitioners moved to

suppress the rifle shells on Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
grounds, but the trial court denied the motion on the ground
that petitioners lacked standing to object to the lawfulness of
the search of the car because they did not own either the car
or the rifle and shells.
In that factual context, the United States Supreme
Court affirmed.

The basis of the ruling however, was that an

automobile passenger in that particular context did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched.

- 12 -

The Rakas opinion, however, firmly established that:
One who owns or la\*fully possess or
controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of
privacy by virtue of his right to
exclude. (Page 143, n. 12)
In Rakas, the Supreme Court abandoned the rule
previously enunciated in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257
(1967), which held that a person who is legitimately on the
premises has standing to litigate the issue of the search of
the location.

In so ruling, the supreme Court noted:
Jones v. United States (citation omitted) and Katz v. United States (citation
omitted) involved significantly
different factual circumstances. Jones
not only had permission to use the
apartment of his friend, but had a key
to the apartment with which he admitted
himself on the day of the search and
kept possessions in the apartment.
Except with respect to his friend,
Jones had complete dominion and contol
over the apartment and could exclude
others from it. Likewise in Katz the
defendant occupied the telephone booth,
shut the door behind him to exclude all
others and paid the toll which entitled
him to assume that the words he uttered
into the mouthpiece would not be
broadcast to the world. Katz and Jones
could legitimately expect privacy in
the areas which were the subject of the
search and seizure sought to contest.
(Page 149)(Emphasis supplied).
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In United States v. Portillo. 633 F.2d 1313 (9th Cir.
1980), the Ninth Circuit employed the above reasoning from Rakas
and held that a defendant, who had both permission to use his
friend's automobile and keys to the ignition and trunk, with
which he could exclude all others, save the owner of the automobile, had standing to challenge the propriety of the search
of the trunk of the automobile.

The Ninth Circuit declared at

Page 1317:
Here, Montellano had both permission to
use his friend1s automobile and the keys
to the ignition and the trunk, with
which he could exclude all others, save
his friend, the owner. Montellano,
therefore, possesses the requisite
legitimate expectation of privacy
necessary to challenge the propriety of
the search.
In United States v. Posey, 663 F.2d 37 (7th Cir.
1981), the Court held that the defendant had an expectation of
privacy in an automobile owned by his wife and over which he
was exercising exclusive control pursuant to her permission at
the time of the search, despite the fact that he did not own
the automobile or guns discovered during the search.

In United

States v. Rose, 731 F.2d 1337 (8th Cir. 1984), the Eighth
Circuit neld that a defendant who had been given permission by
his sister to use her car, although seated as a passenger, had

- 14-

a legitimate expectation of privacy in the car and had standing
to assert his Fourth Amendment claim regarding the search of
the trunk.
It is well established that a person may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in a place or object which he does
not own.
1982).

United States v. Perez, 689 F.2d 1336, 1338 (9th Cir.
In Perez, defendants who had entered into a formalized

arrangement for the transportation of contraband in a pickup
truck being driven by an accomplice and who kept the truck under
close surveillance by riding in it or following it in another
vehicle had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the truck,
even though they did not own it and even though the truck had
been hired by another person for another purpose.
As outlined in the Rakas opinion, legitimate presence
in the area searched accompanied by the ability to exclude
others from that area confers upon the person a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the area searched,.

In analyzing

Jones, supra, the Rakas court specifically noted that Jones not
only had the permission of his friend, but also had a key and
kept possessions in the apartment.
Here, as in Jones, Defendant and Villa had permission
to use the car for an extended two week vacation.
legitimate presence in the area searched.

There was a

Here, as in Jones,

- 15-

Defendant had a key to the area searched.

JThe facts adduced at

the suppression hearing show that Defendant was the driver of
the vehicle and in fact had to use that key to open the trunk
of the car.

Defendant had complete dominion and control over

the vehicle and could exclude others from it.

Here, as in

Jones, Defendant kept his possessions in the area searched.
Here, as in Jones, the inevitable conclusion is that Defendant
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched.
The Rakas decision and its progeny overwhelmingly establish
this analytical conclusion.
Conceptually, the case for standing becomes even
stronger when a person has made the area searched his temporary
living quarters.

In United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152

(5th Cir. 1981), the Fifth Circuit held that a defendant had a
legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to records
secreted in his parent's home and under their bed, where the
defendant's parents had given him permission to use their home
and had given him a key.

As outlined in Haydel, supra, at Page

1155:
The defendant in Jones, similarly, had
permission to use the place searched,
the apartment of a friend, had a key to
the apartment, and kept possessions
there. Except with respect to the
owner, Jones had control over the
apartment and could exclude others.

- 16-

The Supreme Court, in Rakas,
specifically observed that it did not
question the conclusion in Jones that
the defendant suffered a violation of
his personal Fourth Amendment rights if
the search in question was unlawful.
It is irrelevant if the temporary living quarters
which the person occupies are mobile.

In United States v.

Pringle, 751 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1984), the First Circuit hel
that the defendants had standing to challenge the search and
seizure of a vessel because the defendants had a right of
privacy in the vessel to the extent afforded any crew member
a small sailing vessel on the high seas.

At Page 423 the Co

It is true that defendants have asserted
that they played no part as owners of
the boat or the marijuana, or as
financers, or managers of the importation scheme. But they were the only
ones aboard the Nirvana at the time of
the seizure. They had charge of her
day-to-day operations and she was their
temporary home. In United States v.
Lochan, (citation omitted) , we" analyzed
Rakas in detail and the cases leading to
it and flowing from it. We concluded
that some of the factors relevant to a
privacy expectation are legitimate
presence in the area searched,
possession or ownership of the area
searched or the property seized, prior
use of the area searched or the property
seized, ability to exclude others use
of the property, and a subjective
expectation of privacy.
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In the factual context of this case, Defendant and
Villa had made the automobile in question their temporary home.
The facts adduced in the proceedings below Show that they were
in the midst of traveling from California to New York.

Personal

possessions of both were found in the interior and trunk of the
vehicle.

Among those personal items were pillows and blankets.

It is abundantly clear that both were living in the vehicle
during the course of a coast to coast trip.

As in Pringle,

supra, they had charge of the day-to-day operations of the
vehicle, and the vehicle was their temporary home.
Applying the factor analysis employed in the Pringle
decision, it is abundantly clear that Defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched.
legitimate presence in the area searched.

Villa!s brother had

given permission for the use of the vehicle.
possession of the area searched.
prior use of the area searched.

There was

Defendant had

Both Defendant and Villa had
Defendant had the ability to

exclude others from the area searched.

He possessed the keys

to the vehicle!s interior and the vehicle's trunk, and manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the area searched.
It cannot be credibly argued that someone who puts an item in a
secret metal compartment in the trunk of a car has not manifested a subjective expectation of privacy.

$ee e.g. United States
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v. Perez, 689 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1982) (Defendants who placed
contraband in an automobile gas tank manifested a subjective
expectation of privacy).
The key analytical concept stemming from the Rakas
opinion is that a criminal defendant must have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the invaded place,,

The Rakas Court

Katz v. United States (citation omitted)
provides guidance in defining the scope
of the interest protected by the Fourth
Amendment. In the course of repudiating
the doctrine derived from Olmstead v.
United States (citation omittedf) and
Goldman v. United States, (citation
omitted) that if police officers had
not been guilty of a common-law trespass
they were not prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment from eavesdropping, the Court
in Katz held that capacity to claim the
protection of the Fourth Amendment
depends not upon a property right in
the invaded place but upon whether the
person who claims the protection of the
Amendment has a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the invaded place. (Page
143)
The Supreme Court of Utah has developed the law of
standing in a manner which parallels that of the many federal
cases which have addressed the issue.

In State v. Purcell, Utah

586 P.2d 441 (1978), the Defendant was apprehended in a stolen
vehicle.

The car in question was searched pursuant to a search

warrant, and the Defendant attacked the search warrant claiming
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that it was issued without probable cause.

The Court held that

Defendant did not have standing to attack the warrant because
of the absence of any possessory or proprietary interest.

At

Page 443 of this opinion, the Court stated:
It is to be noted at the outset that
this appeal is without merit for one
very obvious reason, if for no other.
Defendant simply lacks standing in
court to attack the warrant as to the
search of the stolen automobile, since
on the facts before us, defendant had
absolutely no possessory or proprietary
interest therein that could have been
invaded.
In State v. Valdez, Utah, 689 P.2d 1334 (1984), the
State introduced evidence that officers had found in an attache
case which was searched pursuant to a vehicle inventory.

The

Court observed that it did not reach the issue of the constitutionality of the search, under either the Constitution of Utah
or that of the United States, because of its view that standing
was not shown by the Defendant.

However, unlike Purcell, supra,

the Court in Valdez linked the issue of standing with the
concept of legitimate expectation of privacy.

Citing both

Purcell, supra, and Rakas, supra, the Court stated at Page 1335:
We do not reach the question of whether
this search was permissible under the
state or federal constitution. Defendant concedes that he did not own the
car or the attache case containing the
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evidence complained of, and he has
failed to show that he had any legitimate expectation of privacy in the
effects searched. Under long-established
precedent, he lacks any standing to
complain of the resulting search.
In State v. Iacono, Utah, 42 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, No.
20434 (September 23, 1986), the Court broadened its discussion
of those factors which are material to a consideration of the
standing issue.

The Defendant in Iacono attacked the warrant-

less search of a trailer which was owned by his mother.

In

holding that the Defendant had made no show of standing, the
Court spoke of those factors which come into play with reference
to a constitutionally protectible interest.

The factors men-

tioned by the Court were (a) ownership, (b) use, (c) possession,
and (d) legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises.

The

observation of the Court appears at Page 27 of the opinion:
But the stipulated evidence also fails
to support defendant's assertion of a
constitutiona11y protectible interest
in the trailer or its contents. There
is no evidence that he shared ownership,
use, or possession of the trailer.
Defendant does not show any legitimate
expecation of privacy in the premises.
In the instant matter, Defendant has made a showing
that he satisfies all but one of the factors which the Court in
Iacono viewed as being critical to determine whether standing
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exists.

The only factor missing from the facts of the instant

case is that of ownership.
the owner of the car.

Defendant did not claim that he was

However, he did claim a shared use and

shared possession of the vehicle, and an obvious expectation of
privacy in the car and its contents.
From the foregoing we can see that the trial Court
committed a two-fold error.

First, the trial Court viewed an

ownership or possessory interest as being the only factors to
support a claim of standing, but then denied effect to its own
announced standard in ruling that standing did not exist in the
face of a clear showing that Defendant had a possessory interest
in the car.

Second, the Court totally failed to consider

factors other than possession or ownership.

No consideration

was given to the factors of use, possession, or the legitimate
expectation of privacy in the effects within the vehicle as
well as the vehicle itself, nor the other factors announced by
the federal cases cited above.

POINT II -- IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO INSTRUCT THE
JURY REGARDING THE OFFENSE OF nAIDING AND ABETTING" AS
DEFINED IN UCA §76-2-202.
The Jury was charged with Instruction No. 15 (TR 202-3)
which was a verbatim recitation of UCA §76-2-202.

Defendant
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took exception to that instruction (TR 190) and cited State v.
Hicken, Utah, 659 P.2d 1038 (1983) (TR 192) to support his
argument.

The State's theory was that Defendants conduct

could make him culpable as either a principal or accessory (TR
195, Lines 3 and 4). The Court observed as well that the
breadth of UCA §76-2-202 would include both conduct of a
principal and accessory (TR 195-6).

Defendant argued that UCA

§76-2-202 was simply not applicable because of the mandate of
UCA §58-37-19.

That section reads as follows:

It is the purpose of this act to
regulate and control the substances
designated within §58-37-4, and
whenever the requirements prescribed,
the offense defined or the penalties
imposed relating to substances
controlled by this act shall be or
appear to be in conflict with Title 58,
Chapter 17 or any other laws of this
state, the provisions of this act shall
be controlling.
Defendant advised the Court of the need to utilize the
provisions of UCA § 58-37-8(1)(a) (iv), if at all, in charging the
jury with an "aiding and abetting" theory (TR 191-2), contending
that the Utah Controlled Substances Act, UCA §58-37-1, et seq
had foreclosed the application of UCA §76-2-202 in a case of
this nature (TR 191).
The harm which resulted to Defendant from employment
of Instruction No. 15 is further highlighted when the evidence
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and the State's theory are examined.

In opening argument,

counsel for the State indicated that documentary evidence would
be offered which would show that Defendant was the author and
custodian of journal entries, accounts and receipts detailing
the distribution of controlled substances (TR 102-3).

In its

cross examination, the State suggested that Defendant was the
keeper of records (TR 181), that he had purchased airline
tickets for others to travel to and from Columbia (TR 182), and
that he provided one Fernando Blanco with a house (TR 183),
Blanco being a dealer in cocaine (TR 185). It is also of interest that the affidavit and search warrant (Exhibit #11) which
Defendant found objectionable, parades before the Jury a large
panorama of people and addresses in Los Angeles, California and
Brownsville, Texas.

These documents weave tales of searches,

seizures, and arrests involving cocaine trafficking over a
period of two years.

Interestingly, however, Defendant's name

is nowhere to be found in that conglomerate of inflammatory and
prejudicial hearsay.
ad infinitum.

Nay, hearsay, upon hearsay, upon hearsay,

What more could the Jury conclude than that

Defendant was an arranger, or that Defendant allowed Fernando
Blanco to use his home when Blanco was in the business of
distributing cocaine.

The latter proposition is revealed by

the affidavit (Exhibit #11) which states that Jose Fernando
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Blanco was receiving mail at Indiana Street, and that a vehicle
registered to him was followed to Indiana Street by a Detective
Mahoney.

This factual scenario is paralleled in State v. Scott,

50 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, Case No. 860284 (1987).

In Scott, at

Page 14, the Court observed:
As mandated by the specific provisions
of sections 58-37-19 and 76-1-103(1),
the owner of a home cannot be charged
with having aided and abetted another
when he or she can be charged with
specifically having permitted his or
her home to be occupied by persons
unlawfully distributing controlled
substances therein. Likewise, a person
cannot be charged with aiding and
abetting another when he or she handles
the negotiations and price of a
constrolled substance, but must instead
by charged with agreeing, consenting,
offering, or negotiating to distribute
a controlled substance as specifically
provided in section 58-37-8(1)(a) (iv).
Scott held that it was reversible error to charge the
Jury under UCA §76-2-202 as opposed to a charge under UCA
§58-37-8(1)(a)(iv).
like manner.
Scott.

The instant matter must be resolved in a

Indeed, this case is a near identical replay of

The prosecution claimed that Defendant afforded Jose

Fernando Blanco, a reputed drug dealer, the use of his home for
that purpose, and that Defendant was the keeper of records,
which catalogued receipts, deliveries, prices, etc., for the
unlawful operations.

Conduct of that nature is the very thing
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which is proscribed by the "arranging" provisions of UCA
§58-37-8(l)(a)(iv).
If the so-called "California evidence" was deleted
from consideration, which Defendant claims it should have been,
then an "arranging" instruction would still have been proper.
Like the Scott case, the instant matter presented facts which
placed the Defendant at or near a scene involving the alleged
distribution or possession of a controlled substance, but a
scene which reveals the participation of other persons in the
events which transpire, such that the Jury is presented with a
question as to who is the principal versus who is the arranger.
The reasoning and holding of Scott, both in overruling
State v. Jeppson, Utah, 546 P.2d 894 (1976) and in following
Hicken, supra, should be the law of this case:
Under the just-cited criteria, section
58-37-19 controls. Although the penalty
for aiding and abetting would be the
same as the penalty for arranging to
distribute, the offenses defined under
the aiding and abetting statute are
different from those defined under the
arranging section. The actus reus under
section
76-2-202 is soliciting, requesting, commanding, encouraging, or aiding
in the substantive offense of distribution. The actus reus under section
58-37-8(1)(a) (iv) constitutes an act of
agreement, consent, offer, or arrangement to distribute. That conflict must
been resolved under the Act, not
outside it...(Page 14).
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Under the Act, it matters very much
what the role of a defendant is in an
exchange of controlled substances for
money. Under the circumstances here,
it was error to allow the State to
instruct the jury on aiding and
abetting. The jury may well have found
defendant guilty of distribution, but
it is equally likely that it convicted
him of aiding and abetting. That
speculation is insufficient foundation
for upholding the verdict.(Page 15)
POINT III -- IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO ADMIT
EXHIBIT #11 IN EVIDENCE.
During the course of the trial, the State called one
Donald H. Barfield, a member of the Los Angeles Police Department, who identified Exhibit #11 as an affidavit and search
warrant for various locations in the Southern California area
(TR 112). Of the many searches which were presumably conducted
under authority of this warrant, Officer Barfield was in charge
of one directed to a home at 6591 Indiana Street, in Buena Park
(TR 113). That search occurred on February 19, 1986 (TR 131),
a week after Defendant had been arrested in Utah.

That particu-

lar effort was but a small portion of a much larger law enforcement operation which was undertaken to spoil what was viewed as
a major international cocaine distribution effort, although the
search of Indiana Street did not produce any cocaine (TR 14445).
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Defendant objected to the introduction of Exhibit #11,
and lengthy discussion was held on the issuk outside the
presence of the Jury (TR 115-131).

The State offered the

exhibit as a foundation for the testimony of Officer Barfield
and the items found by him when he searched Indiana Street.
The Court received the exhibit under the same rationale.

The

discussion among the Court and counsel is instructive:
THE COURT: ...so he has to iky his
foundation. And the only purpose of
this is to lay a foundation for acts
this officer did and things hp found...
(TR 125, Lines 23, 24 and 25; TR 126,
Line 1)
MR. BROWN:
Line 3)

That!s correct. (TR 126,

Defense counsel could not see the |logic of admitting
the exhibit when the State suggested it be 'received but not
given to the Jury:
MR. BROWN: I have no objection if the
Jury doesn!t see this document... (TR
126, Lines 8 and 9)
MR. TAYLOR: If the Jury's not going to
see it I don!t see that it has any
purpose. (TR 126, Lines 13 and 14)
Nevertheless, the exhibit was received, and it did go to the
Jury (TR 129).
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A search warrant and its supporting affidavit may be
proper items of evidence in the context of a motion to suppress,
but they are certainly not necessary items to lay the foundation
for the testimony of an officer who conducts the search.

Other-

wise, we would be asking the Jury to pass upon the legality of
the search itself.

A statement which is inadmissible hearsay

is not rendered admissible because it is transformed from oral
form to a writing, or because it is embodied in an affidavit.
An affidavit for a search warrant has no greater legal dignity
than any other item of hearsay.

It is inadmissible.

Hall v.

State, (1939) 136 Tex Crim 320, 125 SW2d 293.
It is the fruit of the search and not its justification which should have the attention of the Jury.

Accordingly,

the basis of the State in offering Exhibit 11, and its receipt
by the Court, that is, for foundational reasons, is meaningless.

There is no rule of law or evidence which requires the

admission of an affidavit and search warrant in evidence as a
necessary prerequisite to the testimony of the officer who
conducts the search and locates contraband or other physical
evidence at the place of the search.

However, the greater

question is whether the exhibit is objectionable because
of its content.

Defendant urges the following in that regard.
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Rule 803, Utah Rules of Evidence
Exhibit #11 is hearsay upon hearsay, upon hearsay, etc.
It recites the observations of state and federal officers
covering a period of two years and ranges from Brownsville,
Texas to the Southern California area.
drug dealers are named.

Over twenty suspected

Searches, arrests and convictions

involving large amounts of cocaine and cash are set forth in
great detail.

The documents talk about Everything and every-

bodyM except Defendant and this case.

Defendant is not

mentioned, nor alluded to in this conglomerate of tale and
intrigue, nor is the Co-defendant Villa mentioned.

There is

also total silence as to any traffic to or through Utah.
Being hearsay in total, Exhibit #11 was not admissible
unless received pursuant to a specific 1 aw or under one of the
hearsay exceptions.

Rules 802 and 803, Utah Rules of Evidence.

With reference to the former, the preliminary committee note to
tiie Utah Rules of Evidence states:
Any existing statutes inconsistent with
these rules, if and when these rules
are adopted by the Supreme Court, will
be impliedly repealed.
If the affidavit portion of Exhibit #11 is viewed as
being in the nature of a police report, or series of police
reports, which in reality it is, then it is clearly inadmissible
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under the rule announced in State v. Bertul, Utah, 664 P.2d
1181 (1983).

The issue in Bertul was the admissibility of a

police booking sheet under the business records exception to
the hearsay rule.
Rules of Evidence.

It was decided under prior Rule 63(13), Utah
In Bertul, the Court reviewed a long history

of case law and concluded that police reports, when offered by
the prosecution, Mshould ordinarily be excluded ..." (Page
1185).

The reasoning of the Court is seen by the following:
In most cases dealing with police
reports of a criminal investigation, it
is apparent that the reports are made
in part in contemplation of litigation.
Although the reports may not be readily
describable as "dripping with motivation
to misrepresent," [quoting from Palmer
v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 63 S.Ct. 477,
87 L.Ed 645 (1943)] their exclusion is
more fundamentally explainable on the
ground that substantial rights under
the confrontation clause of the United
States Constitution, and especially the
right of cross-examination, may be
severely prejudiced when the
information in the report calls into
question the motivation and the
accuracy of perception, recall, the
manner of language usage, or the
soundness of conclusions by the author
of the report. Cf. Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct.
1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (the right
to cross-examine is essential to a fair
trial). It would be "error and
ordinarily reversible error to receive
an exhibit containing ! a neat
condensation of the government's whole
case against the defendantT" in the
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form of a police report for which there
can be no effective cross-examination.
United States v. Parker, 491 F.2d 529
(8th Cir.1974) (denial of rehearing;
main opinion at 491 F.2d 517) (quoting
Sanchez v. United States, supra, 293
F.2d at 269; United States v. Ware,
supra, 247 F.2d at 700). We have long
ago forsaken the practice of allowing a
person to be convicted on the basis of
out-of-court statements, whether
written or oral, of persons not subject
to cross-examination.
If Exhibit #11 is viewed as a public record, then it
is inadmissible by the very rule that would receive public
reports and records as exceptions to the hearsay rule.

The

applicable provision in this regard is Rule 803(8), Utah Rules
of Evidence, which calls for the admission of a broad range of
public documents but excludes "... in criminal cases matters
observed by police officers and other law enforcement
personnel...".
excludes.

Exhibit #11 is the very thing which this Rule

It consists entirely of matters observed by police

officers in criminal cases.

Accordingly, it cannot come in

evidence as a public record exception to the hearsay rule.

Rule 404, Utah Rules of Evidence
Exhibit #11 is also objectionable because it implies
the commission by Defendant of other crimes or wrongs in
general.

Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence.

That may very
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well have been a specific purpose of the prosecution in seeking
its admission.

The trial Court initially inquired of the State

in that regard:
THE COURT: What is the purpose of this
evidence? (TR 103, Line 15)
MR. BROWN: The purpose is to show his
involvement in the distribution of
controlled substances (TR 103, lines 16
and 17).
Counsel for the State continued his explanation, but
changed his theory to one of attacking Defendant's credibility
by indicating his intent to rebut claims of Defendant which
were contained in pleadings filed in connection with a motion
for severance (TR 103). The problem with that approach is that
the Jury never saw those pleadings (they were never offered in
evidence) but the Jury was exposed to Exhibit #11.

The assault

against Defendant's character was complete.
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible
if relevant to prove some material fact in the crime or charge
on trial.

The admissible purposes, stated by illustration in

Rule 404, such as opportunity, intent, preparation, etc., mean
opportunity for the crime on trial, or intent to commit the
crime on trial, or preparation for the crime on trial, not
opportunity, or intent, or preparation for some other crime.
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State v. Forsyth, Utah, 641 P.2d 1172 (1982).

Exhibit #11 does

not contain one scintilla of information which has the slightest
relationship to the present case.

Rule 405, Utah Rules of Evidence
Defendant also contended that Exhibit #11 was highly
prejudicial (TR 124-5).

Such evidence may be excluded if its

"probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice:.

Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence.

A reading

of the Exhibit should be sufficient argument for support of this
proposition.

Even if this Exhibit had relevance, the Court did

not, and could not, assess its "inherent reliability".
v. Schreuder, Utah, 39 Adv. Rep. 46 (8-15-86).

State

There was no

evidence contained in the exhibit, let alone relevant evidence,
that could not have been presented by means of the testimony of
Officer Barfield, thus avoiding the prejudicial impact.
v. Cloud, Utah, 722 P.2d 750 (1986).

State

If by some strained logic,

Exhibit #11 is construed to show participation of Defendant in
a drug transaction, it would nevertheless be objectionable (see
cases annotated at 93 ALR 2d 1097-1115, and supplement,
Admissibility, in Prosecution for Illegal Sale of Narcotics, of
Evidence of Other Sales).
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POINT IV -- THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EXHIBIT 14 IN
EVIDENCE.
Exhibit #14 was admitted over objection of Defendant
on grounds, among others, that it, too, was inadmissible
evidence of other crimes or wrongs (TR 143),.

The same argument

regarding Exhibit #11, above, applies with even greater force
to this exhibit.

The State produced Jeffery Martin Gordon

LaSuis1, an agent of the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration
(TR 136) who testified that Exhibit #14 was a record of cocaine
transactions (TR 139-41).

The document itself was in Spanish,

and presumably unintelligible to the Jury on its face, but
coupled with Officer LaSuis' testimony, it was highly damaging
to Defendant.

Defendant admitted being the author, in part, of

the document (TR 177), although his explanation was that he
prepared it at the request of another (TR 178) to reflect
records of a canning or bottling plant (TR 179). Notwithstanding that explanation, the impact on the Jury could only
have been significant.

The problem with the exhibit, if the

LaSuisf testimony is believed, is that it shows Defendant as
having participated in a distribution of cocaine in California
at a place and at a time which have no relationship to the crime
on trial.

The absence of any such connection is revealed by the

testimony of LaSuis1 who stated that two packages of cocaine
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bearing the markings

lf

SKFM and

l!

P35!f were found in the posses-

sion of one Lorize Fernando Vega, who was arrested in California
in January, 1986.

Those same code markings appear in Exhibit

#14 (TR 160). However, the State did not offer any evidence to
connect the cocaine which was seized in the instant case with
any cocaine which may have been identified by the codes which
appear in Exhibit #14.

Indeed, the cocaine seized in the case

at bar had no cryptic markings on the packages.
The danger in admitting evidence of prior crimes and
wrongs is explained in State v. Saunders, Utah, 699 P.2d 738,
741 (1985), wherein the Court stated:
The basis of these limitations on the
admissibility of evidence of prior
crimes is the tendency of a fact finder
to convict the accused because of bad
character rather than because he is
shown to be guilty of the offenses
charged. Because of this tendency,
such evidence is presumed prejudicial
and, absent a reason for the admission
of the evidence other than to show
criminal disposition, the evidence is
excluded (Emphasis added).
The danger was fatal in the instant matter.

The

testimony of Officer LaSuis1 in interpreting Exhibit #14 could
be seen to reflect that Defendant committed many other crimes,
although separate and apart from the crime charged.

The early

case of State vs. Bowen, Utah, 134 P 623 (1913), is instructive.
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In Bowen, the Defendant was convicted of larceny of a cow.

The

cow in question disappeared from the open range and was never
seen again.

However, witnesses saw five cattle hides and one

horse hide thereafter at Defendant's barn.
fied as that of the missing cow.
as belonging to another person.

One hide was identi-

Another hide was identified
All of the hides were taken to

the Courthouse at the time of trial, marked as exhibits, and
admitted in evidence, except the horse hide. The Court held the
admission of the hides, except that of the victim, to be prejudicial error, even though evidence was not presented to show
that the other hides were from stolen cattle.

However, the

State made the inference that the other hides were from stolen
cattle, and apparently that inference was buttressed by their
very admission in evidence.

If it was error to admit evidence

of other crimes in Bowen, where the evidence was found at the
same place and at the same time as the primary item of physical
evidence for the crime charged, then how much greater is the
error in the instant matter to admit evidence of an alleged
drug ledger far removed in time and place from the facts of the
crime at issue.
If the State had offered Exhibit #14 as rebuttal
evidence to impeach the credibility of Defendant, then it may
well have been proper as a prior inconsistent statement (or
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conduct), and thus by definition not hearsay.
Utah Rules of Evidence.
the proceedings.

However, that was not the course of

Exhibit #14 was offered and received during

the State!s case in chief.
corner.

Rule 801 (d)(1),

Defendant was then backed into a

He could live with the near

t!

mortal wound" or testify

himself and attempt a healing explanation. The latter option
was selected, but the patient died.

The Jury was relegated to

performing the burial.

CONCLUSION
Should the Court conclude that Defendant met the
preliminary threshold so as to give him standing to attack the
search of the vehicle, then he would be entitled to a remand to
the trial Court to litigate the search and seizure issue.

If

any one of the other errors assigned on appeal, that is, the
employment of an improper jury instruction, or the improper
receipt of either Exhibit #11 or Exhibit #14, is found by this
Court to have merit, then a remand for a new trial would
likewise be the appropriate relief.

Accordingly, if the Court

finds merit as to any claim of Defendant, a remand is the
appropriate remedy, and depending upon the view of this Court,
a new trial would be either with or without consideration of
the search and seizure issue.

It is therefore necessary for
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the Court to rule upon each of the assignments of error,
Otherwise, if a remand occurs, the trial Court would be left
without appropriate guidelines to follow in connection with a
new trial.
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